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TRIBUTE TO BOB MOFFAT

by Professor Winston P. Nagan*
The faculty at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of
Law is saddened, and in some degree diminished, by the passing of our
colleague Bob Moffat. In remembrance of Bob, I wanted to share some
thoughts about his achievements as a colleague and professor.
I have known Bob since I came to the University of Florida College
of Law in 1975. He welcomed me to the school by taking me to lunch.
From the very beginning of our relationship, Bob was interested in the
fact that I came from a Commonwealth background (South Africa).
Bob's own Commonwealth connection was with Australia, where he
earned his LLM on a Fulbright Scholarship and where he met the
woman who would be his wife-Janette. These connections gave Bob a
certain affinity toward matters culturally connected to the
Commonwealth. We often discussed Australian constitutional law; and
he introduced me to the works of Australia's leading legal thinkers,
such as Julius Stone. Bob appreciated our shared interest in legal theory
and encouraged me to attend the meeting of the International Society of
Social Philosophy and the Philosophy of Law, in which he was an
influential member and a former President. Upon attending, Bob
introduced me to several important philosophers and legal theorists,
including Elizabeth Flowers and Lon Fuller. Bob was well-regarded by
all; and it was an honor to be there as his guest.
Bob was a serious legal theorist. Before coming to UF to teach, he
was doing Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) graduate work at Harvard
under Fuller. Bob came to Fuller having been influenced by the
Australian approach to legal theory. This meant that Bob brought to
Fuller's approach (focusing on the morality of law) a basic
understanding of the salience of the social sciences to legal theory, as
well. In my own understanding of Bob's SJD work, he had been
grappling with the issue of rationally integrating the 'is' and the 'ought'.
Unfortunately, Fuller died just as Bob was completing his dissertation.
This was a major trial for Bob, not least because it resulted in some
confusion about the completion of his dissertation. Fuller had not
generated a distinctive following on the Harvard faculty, where the
dominant jurisprudential approach was a version of positivism (the
Legal Process approach). Ultimately, Bob was assigned a dissertation
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advisor who attacked the same lines of inquiry that Fuller had
encouraged him to develop. Later, as a fellow theorist and
jurisprudential specialist, Bob sent me this advisor's critique of his SJD
dissertion; and he asked me to review the dissertation itself. It was clear
that Bob's work at Harvard meant very much to him. Upon reading his
dissertation, it was clear, too, that Bob had produced a creative,
disciplined development of Fuller's fundamental ideas. The new advisor
had been so rooted in Austin's conventional positivism that he could not
transcend the paradigm to appreciate Bob's valuable contribution to
legal theory. His dissertation was a needed contribution to
understanding the importance of Fuller's approach to law and morality.
Indeed, it extended in significant ways Fuller's analysis of the nature of
law. I suggested that Bob's dissertation manuscript should have been
published as a book. However, Bob published several chapters
separately, and also used his dissertation to generate influential papers
in the American Society of Social Philosophy and the Philosophy of
Law.
Our shared interest in jurisprudence brought Bob and I especially
close when we worked together on a committee to assess the possibility
of a jurisprudence course offering for the first year classes. One of the
central concerns for both of us was that, in teaching the course, the
content could vary radically depending upon who taught the course.
Bob's own experiences in conflicting schools of legal theory became a
valuable contribution to the development of what we thought could be a
core curriculum. We proposed that jurisprudential ideas not only should
be included as an orientation to legal education, but also that they
should be taught to reveal the theoretical and philosophical bases of
legal assumptions. Bob understood that professors themselves could
improve as teachers, if they recognized and understood alternate schools
of jurisprudence. We also agreed that students should have a basic
understanding of the outlines of positivism, natural law, realism,
sociological jurisprudence, as well as an introduction to the theories that
shape precedent,
statutory interpretation,
and constitutional
interpretation.
One of the very useful tools for education that Bob introduced me to
was Fuller's "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers." In this thoughtbased court opinion, Fuller used the different justices to write judgments
from different major theoretical perspectives. This suggested that if we
took leading cases from the constitutional law of the U.S. Supreme
Court, we could identify different theoretical influences in the way the
different judges express themselves. Griswold v. Connecticut is a good
example of this. Additionally, it gave the students a sense that ideas are

reflected in practical legal judgments, and even more importantly, in the
definition of lawyer roles themselves.
Bob's jurisprudential insights were extremely important and may not
have been fully appreciated by our faculty. When Bob expressed an
interest in legal theory at Oxford-a school rooted in modem versions
of analytical positivism-I recommended him to J.K.B.M. Nicholas,
who was then Principal of Brasenose College (University of Oxford).
Nicholas invited Bob as a Visiting Fellow; and I was able to visit Bob at
Oxford while he was there. At Oxford, Bob attended and actively
participated in most of the advanced-level seminars and colloquia on
legal theory. During my own stay as a Fellow, Bob was fondly
remembered to me by the jurisprudence community.
Bob and I often taught the same students; and we shared the
appreciation for students who were attracted to a deeper analysis and
insight into the law as a learned profession. Both of us taught Professor
Malloy, who holds a distinguished chair at Syracuse and has written
extensively and critically on issues of law and economics. We both
admired Malloy's intellectual curiosity and his passion for theoreticallyinformed scholarship. Bob also taught UF's own Professor Amy
Mashburn when she was a student here; and I know that Bob took pride
in the fact that Professor Mashburn had been one of his most thoughtful
and intellectually gifted students. As always, good teachers are living
tributes to their own good teachers.
In my view, Bob Moffat critically helped to keep the light of
jurisprudence alive as an important part of the culture of this faculty,
and as a meaningful contribution to the education of our students. Bob's
passing is a significant loss to all of us at the law school, as well as a
loss to the community of scholars. We were lucky to have him with us
for as long as we did.

